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A Third Conflicts Restatement

t

FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER*
INTRODUCTION

How does one restate gibberish? Anyone who looks at American judicial opinions
dealing with choice-of-law issues must conclude that the field is in a desolate state.
Deprecating current case law, Kramersaid that "[e]xisting decisions on choice of law
are products of a long tradition of confused and misguided thinking."' Indeed, the
judicial prose has an Alice-in-Wonderland kind of quality: one reads about "contacts"
and "interests" as if these concepts were pretty much the same thing, or perhaps
closely related;2 one has to plow through lengthy and wholly unconvincing
dissertations about the interests states have in effectuating the dubious policies that
supposedly inform guest statutes;3 one finds authors who are at doctrinal loggerheads
peacefully united in a single footnote;4 one encounters prose so turgid and stilted that
one suspects the judge (or more likely the law clerk who actually drafted the opinion)
never really grasped the idea behind the particular conflicts approach the court
purports to follow.
Even more depressing, however, at least to those who teach the subject, is the
disarming candor with which some judges deplore the "post-revolutionary" conflicts
law.' Coherence and clarity are hardly the hallmark of academic writing; scholarly
opinions differ vastly on what contacts count, and whether interests-the magic
ingredient of "modem" choice-of-law analysis-actually exist.6 Hence, before

t Copyright 2000 by Friedrich K. Juenger.
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
1. Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice ofLaw Code, 89 MICH. L. REv.

2134, 2149 (1991).
2. "'[F]ora State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner,
that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."' Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)). This mantra leaves unclear whether (and how) contacts
automatically spawn interests, whether all ofthem or only some ofthem do, and what precisely
the interrelationship between these two commodities happens to be.
3. Compare Neumeier v. Kuchner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 455 (N.Y. 1972) (Fuld, C.J.)
(protecting drivers and owners from ungrateful guests), with Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d
279, 284 (N.Y. 1963) (Fuld, J.) (preventing drivers from colluding with passengers to defraud
insurers). As to the real "policy" informing these enactments, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 215-16 (5th ed. 1984).

4. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 318 n.4 (Colo. 1973); O'Connor
v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 18 n.8 (Conn. 1986); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610,616 n. I
(Me. 1970).
5. See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
("The law on 'choice of law'... is a veritable jungle, which, if the law can be found out, leads
not to a 'rule of action' but a reign of chaos.. . ."); Fisher v. Huck, 624 P.2d 177, 178 (Or.
1981) (stating that applying the Restatement is like "skeet shooting with a bow and arrow").
6. See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 135 (1993).
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embarking on a new restatement, we would be well advised to heed Yogi Berra's
warning that "You got to be careful if you don't know where you're going, because
you might not get there."
Given the present state of conflicts law and literature, it should come as no surprise
that some courts prefer the wisdom of the past and there may even be academics who
long nostalgically for the days when rules were clear and precise. In fact, one reads
that this country's Constitution requires conflicts rules of the traditional type,'
although one might question whether the conflict of laws (a discipline that did not
really matter much in this country before Story wrote his famous Commentaries)9 was
uppermost in the Founding Fathers' minds. Certainly, one cannot help but shudder
when thinking about the Supreme Court's taking an active role in this field
considering what it has done to the far simpler subject ofjurisdiction.° And yet, some
conflicts scholars have urged the Justices to take a more active role, '" though few
would share the view that the Court should ordain territorialist rules akin to (albeit
more sophisticated than) those of the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws"
("FirstRestatement").
1.THE SECOND RESTATEMENT

The cacophony of discordant voices suggests that conflicts law, both the academic
and the judicial variety, is in a sad and unrestateable shape. Even if it were possible
to penetrate the gibberish and to find out what the courts are actually doing, 3 the

7. See, e.g., Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819,820,823 (Ala. 1991)
(stating that lex loci delicti "has been the rule in Alabama for almost 100 years" and that
"newer approaches to choice of law problems are neither less confusing nor more certain");
Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 854 (N.C. 1988) (explaining that the lex loci delicti
rule represents an "objective and convenient approach").
8. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
ConstitutionalFoundationsof Choice ofLaw, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 249, 317-19, 322-31, 337

(1992).
9. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834).
10. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdictionand
Choice ofLaw: A DismalProspect, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 907 (1981). But cf William M.
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenonto an EmpiricalRestatement ofConflicts, 75

IND. L.J.417 (2000) (noting the desirability of restating the SecondRestatement'sjurisdictional
rules to take account of Supreme Court case law).
11. See, e.g., Peter Hay, Full Faithand Credit and Federalism in Choice of Law, 34

MERCER L. REV. 709, 722,727-29 (1983); Laycock, supranote 8, at 331-36,337; Willis L.M.
Reese, The Hague Case: An OpportunityLost, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195, 201-02 (1981).
12.RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST

RESTATEMENT]. For the view that the Court should ordain territorialist views, see Laycock,

supra note 8, at 330-31, 337.
13. Two statistical analyses suggest answers. See Patrick J.Borchers, The Choice-of-Law
Revolution: An EmpiricalStudy, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357 (1992); Michael E. Solimine,
An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REv. 49 (1989).

Regrettably, the answers they suggest differ substantially. Concerning the need for such an
analysis see Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 419 n.15.
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subject-in spite of its venerable age' 4 -seems to lack the maturity one ought to
require before attempting to cast it in concrete. In fact, the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict ofLaws 5 ("Second Restatement") stands as a warning against the efforts to
enshrine disparate and vacillating conflicts doctrines in black-letter rules. For good
reasons, the Reporter's valiant attempt to present the widely divergent views extant
at the time and tojumble together incompatible schools ofthought has been criticized
on the ground that it "does not significantly refine and discipline theory and
analysis."' 6
Many courts seem to like the "mishmash," or "kitchen-sink,"' 7 concoction the
restaters produced; 8 after all, it enables judges to decide conflicts cases any which
way they wish. To be sure, the Second Restatement's unprincipled eclecticism has
done little to strengthen the intellectual underpinnings of our discipline. Nevertheless,
that Restatement, notwithstanding its "ungainly and doubtful apparatus,"' 9 did
faithfully reflect the onslaught of ideas advocated during a "period of transition,"2
when traditional wisdom succumbed to the nouvelle vague. In fact, we have not
progressed much beyond the salad days of the "conflicts revolution"'" whose
achievements its Reporter attempted to codify, as best he could, when all was new
and wonderful and "revolutionaries" boldly forged ahead. After all, there were good
reasons for inventing novel approaches that defied the conventional conflicts wisdom
enshrined in the FirstRestatement, whose lex loci delicti rule22 all too often yielded
unpalatable decisions in interstate and international cases.'
The Second Restatement, vague and unprincipled as it was, had the distinct virtue
of suggesting to judges that they are not bound by any hard and fast rules, which
inevitably prompted undesirable outcomes in interstate and international cases. Its
eclectic jumble of "disparate elements"'24 included tentative near rules, nonrules that
used a soft "'most significant relationship"' connecting factor, as well as state

14. See JUENGER,supra note 6, at 1I.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971)
RESTATEMENT].

[hereinafter SECOND

16. Arthur T. von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology,60 CORNELL L.
REv. 927, 964 (1975).
17. William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice ofLaw: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?,
34 MERCER L. REv. 645 (1983).
18. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1997, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 233, 266 (1998) [hereinafter Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts];see
also Symeon C. Symeonides, The JudicialAcceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:
A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REv. 1248 (1997).
19. Louise Weinberg, A StructuralRevision ofthe ConflictsRestatement, 75 IND. L.J. 475,
478 (2000).
20. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Needfor a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a Proposal
for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 443 (2000).
21. An expression apparently coined by Ehrenzweig, one of the "revolutionaries." Albert
A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolutionin Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 377 (1966).
22. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, §§ 377, 378, 384.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 82-90.
24. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 424.
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"interests" and "policies."25 This arsenal allowed courts to select, from among a
panoply of possibilities, those rules of decision which they found most useful in the
pursuit ofmultistatejustice.26 In a way, it was a non-Restatement: by mixing together
all manner of doctrinal currents, it simply furnished courts with any number of
plausible reasons to support whatever results they wished to reach. That, no doubt,
is the principal reason why judges like it27 and academics detest it.
II. THE DEARTH OF NEW IDEAS

Little has happened in American conflicts law since. Current judicial opinions still
rely on the approaches the Second Restatement enshrines and in the academic realm
the gospels of yesteryear's prophets are still discussed,28 albeit with "diminishing
returns."'29 I say prophets because, not without reason, modem choice-of-law thinking
has been compared to theology. 0 In particular, the writings of followers of the late
Brainerd Currie, whose school of"interest analysis" continues to dominate American
scholarly discussion, have attained the status of a credo. They have spawned cults that
dot the conflicts swamp with "stagnant pools of doctrine, each jealously guarded by
its adherents."3 In these murky surroundings they continue, to this day, to debate
such figments of the legal imagination as conflicts true and false and the unprovidedfor case.32 Of course, the fact that these self-inflicted embarrassments of interest
analysis33 still have not been laid to rest thirty-three years after Currie's death hardly
inspires confidence in that particular school of thought.
Lacking new ideas, our discipline is stuck in a time warp, as a recent symposium
vividly illustrates.34 This may explain why the conflict of laws has lost much of the

25. JUENGER, supra note 6, at 105-06.
26. Some, of course, may consider this a vice rather than a virtue. See Symeonides, supra
note 20, at 439.
27. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 429-30; Symeonides, supra note 20, at 440
n.14.
28. See William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371,
1384 (1997).
29. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 426.
30. See Courtland H. Peterson, Weighing Contacts in Conflicts Cases: The Handmaiden
Axiom, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 436, 441 n.30 (1971) (commenting on interest analysis); see also
Friedrich K. Juenger, What Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 509, 509 (1985).
31. Herma Hill Kay, The Use of ComparativeImpairmentTo Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluation ofthe CaliforniaExperience, 68 CAL. L. REV. 577, 615 (1980).
32. These strange phenomena continue to occupy scholars. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, The
Myth ofthe "Unprovided-For" Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989); Joseph W. Singer, Facing
Real Conflicts, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197 (1991). They also still feature prominently in case
books. See, e.g., ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 138-206 (5th ed. 1993);
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY COLLINS PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, CONFLICT
OF LAWS, AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 119-244 (1998).
33. Concerning the reasons for these conundrums, see JUENGER, supranote 6, at 138, 156.
34. See Symposium, Choice ofLaw: How It Ought To Be, 48 MERCERL. REV. 623 (1997).
For critical comments, see Patrick J.Borchers, Back to the Past: Anti-Pragmatismin American
Conflicts Law, 48 MERCER L.REv. 721 (1997); Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law: How It
Ought Not to Be, 48 MERCER L. REV. 757 (1997); see also Richman & Reynolds, supra note
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glamor it once enjoyed. The author of the first American conflicts treatise called it
"the most interesting, the most delicate, and the most embarrassing and difficult"
legal subject;3" it prompted Story to write a magisterial treatise; and Cardozo still
credited conflicts law with being "one of the most baffling subjects of legal science" 6
(albeit criticizing it for being "blind to final causes").3" Current opinions about it are
far less flattering. Of course, the conflict of laws has always been an opaque
discipline; but it has become even more so after the late Dean Prosser scathingly
denounced it as a "quaking quagmire[]."3' By now, many states have dropped the
subject from their bar examinations.3 9 In fact, the conflict of laws seems to embarrass
the University of Michigan sufficiently to suppress that title in the law school
catalogue; while it is still taught at that institution, it parades under the label
"Jurisdiction and Choice of Law" (even though judgments recognition as well is
covered).4" Thus, the subject's very name is in jeopardy; indeed, a recent student
contribution keeps calling it (as many nowadays do) "conflicts of law."'" What can
we do to restore its previous prestige; would a new restatement help?
III. BLACK-LETTER RULES
Last August, Dean Symeonides served as the General Reporter on the topic of
"Private International Law at the End of the Twentieth Century: Progress or
Regress?" forthe XV Annual Congress ofthe International Academy ofComparative
Law. He maintained-as he does in this Symposium-thatwe need written choice-oflaw norms.42 By way of example, he referred to the Neumeier rules developed by the
Court of Appeals of New York,43 the conflicts provisions of the American Law

10, at 419-26. Introverted and preoccupied with marginal problems, American conflicts law
has also lost the urbanity and comparative law perspective that used to characterize it. See
Friedrich K. Juenger, The Needfor a ComparativeApproach to Choice-of-Law Problems,73

TUL. L. REV. 1309 (1999).
35. SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE
CONTRARIETY OF THE PosIvE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS 1 (New Orleans,

B. Levy 1828).
36. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 67 (1928).
37.Id at 68.
38. William L. Prosser, InterstatePublication,51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
39. One may lament the fact that the bar examiners have eliminated the subject, see
Weinberg, supranote 19, at 478 n.16, but how are they to grade the examinees' answers given
the current confusion?
40. The University of Michigan Law School, All Course Descriptions (visited Nov. 29,
1999) <http:/www.law.umich.edu/cfusion/templatecourse.dbm?CourselD=693All>.
At
Stanford the subject is apparently no longer taught at all. See William H. Allen & Erin A.
O'Hara, Second Generation Law andEconomics of Conflict ofLaws: Baxter's Comparative
Impairment andBeyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1011, 1047 (1999).
41. Jason Andrew Macke, Note, OfCovenantsand Conflicts-When "IDo" Means More
ThanIt UsedTo, But Less Than You Thought, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1377passim(1998). The Note

won an award, whose judges presumably labored under the same difficulty as the author.
42. See Symeonides, supranote 20, at 447.

43. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972).
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Institute's ("ALl") Complex Litigation Project 4 and those of the Louisiana Civil
Code,45 of which he was the principal draftsman. Similarly, Professor Courtland
Peterson, the American National Reporter, after noting that "[s]ome pessimistic
observers are appalled" '46 by the current disarray of American conflicts doctrine,
voiced the hope for a "system of principled rules."47 He as well4 referred to the
Neumeier rules and those of the ALI's Complex Litigation Project. 1
I, for one, question whether either the New York case law or the provisions of the
Louisiana Civil Code and the ALl Project are models that deserve emulation.49 In my
opinion, the Neumeier rules (which were designed to deal with foreign guest statutes,
an issue that has since largely evaporated)"0 leave much to be desired. In practical
application they are bound to produce results that are even worse than those
compelled by the First Restatement's inflexible lex loci delicti rule, as the
"notoriously wrong case"'" of Schultz v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica, Inc. 2 demonstrates.
That case dealt with tort actions against the Boy Scouts for negligent supervision of
an aberrant priest, who had molested two New Jersey boys in New York and in New
Jersey, one of whom killed himself. The court of appeals dismissed the complaints
of his parents and surviving brothbr because, according to the majority, Neumeier
required application of a New Jersey statute that had resurrected the charitable
immunity doctrine 3 (which New Jersey's highest court had earlier disavowed as
incompatible with reason and justice).5 4 Even the wooden and mechanical lex loci
delicti rule would have yielded a less appalling result.
Nor are the Complex Litigation Project's choice-of-law rules, which have not
attracted uniform acclaim, 5 or the Louisiana Civil Code's choice-of-law provisions,
which Dean Symeonides drafted, likely to promote multistate justice. As to the latter,
let me quote their introductory provision:
Except as otherwise provided in this Book, an issue in a case having contacts with
would be most
other states is governed by the law of the state whose policies
seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue. 6

44. AMIERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS
AND ANALYSIS § 6.01 (d) (1994).
45. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3515-3549 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).

46. Courtland H. Peterson, Private InternationalLaw at the End of the Twentieth Century:
Progressor Regress?, 46 AM. J.COMP. L. 197, 225 (Supp. 1998).

at 226.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 226, 227.
49. But see Symeonides, supranote 20, at 447 n.55.
50. Apparently, the only state that still has such a statute is Alabama. See ALA. CODE § 321-2 (1989).
51. Weinberg, supra note 19, at 504.
52. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
53. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1987 & Supp. 1999).
54. See Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 141 A.2d 276 (N.J. 1958); Dalton v. Saint
Luke's Catholic Church, 141 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1958).
55. See Symposium, American Law Institute Complex LitigationProject, 54 LA. L. REV.
833 (1994).
56. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3515(I) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
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This mantra, reiterated in subsequent articles, 7 harkens back to Baxter's 1963
article," which-wittingly or unwittingly-borrowed an idea from the French
conflicts author Pillet, who had advocated what he called the "law of least
sacrifice."' 9 How you go about measuring the impairment of policies or interests,
constructs of the legal imagination that lack physical attributes such as weight or
length, I do not know; the attempt at calibrating intangibles reminds me of Justice
Traynor's rhetorical question how
you can possibly "'weigh a bushel of horse
6'
feathers against next Thursday.'
The second paragraph of the introductory code provision is hardly more plausible
than the first. It reads as follows:
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant
policies of all involved states in the light of: (1) the relationship of each state to
the parties and the dispute; and (2) the policies and needs of the interstate and
international systems, including the policies of upholding the justified
expectations of parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences that might
follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.6
This provision foists a formidable task on thejudiciary. Perhaps Louisiana judges are
a particularly hardy breed that is undaunted by the hodgepodge of factors demanding
simultaneous attention. But ifjudges can indeed be trusted to perform that feat, why
should we not simply stick with the equally eclectic nonrules of the Second
Restatement? After all, that book is already available in most law libraries and
presents pretty much the same amorphous blob of considerations, leaving courts-as
article 3515 does-with a lot of choices but without any real guidance.
The tort rules Dean Symeonides contributed to this Symposium62 are equally
questionable. The distinction he draws between "conduct regulation" and "loss
distribution" is, as he admits,63 a difficult one. Yet he feels that this dichotomy is
necessary and useful for attaining an equilibrium between the territorial and the
personal reach of laws.' Alas, that "equilibrium" (whatever the term may mean) is
threatened by the fact that-as the much maligned Joseph Beale already informed
us--every law has both a personal and a territorial dimension. 6' As the glossators'
vain attempts to divide "statutes" into real and personal (as well as mixed!) ones 6 go
to show, such an undertaking is doomed to failure. Worse yet, the provisions Dean
Symeonides drafted for this Symposium incorporate inconsistent methodologies.

57. See id. arts. 3537 (contracts), 3542 (torts).
58. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1963).
59. Antoine Pillet, Thiorie continentale des conflits de lois, 2 RECUE1L DES COURs 447,
466-71,482 (1924).
60. Brainerd Currie, The DisinterestedThird State, 28 LAW & CONTEMPI. PROBS. 754
(1963) (quoting Roger J. Traynor, Res Ipsa in California,37 CAL. L. REv. 183, 225 (1949)).
61. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3515 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
62. See Symeonides, supra note 20, at 450-51.
63. Id. at 452-53.
64. See id. at 453.
65.3 JOSEPH H. BEALE, ATREATISEONTHE CONFLICTOF LAWS app. § 53, at 1929 (1935).
66. See JUENGER, supra note 6, at 14-15.
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While he speaks of "interests," '67 his rules are of the multilateral variety (as they must
be because, like other unilateralist approaches, interest analysis is antithetical to
rules).6" But unilateralism and multilateralism are antithetical to each other and
therefore do not mix well; at best they yield an unstable emulsion reminiscent of that
which the Second Restatement bestowed upon us.
IV. THE RAW MATERIAL FOR A THIRD RESTATEMENT

Must we not conclude, then, that it would be premature, ifnot foolhardy, to embark
on the task of drafting yet another conflicts restatement? Certainly, ifmy experience
as a member of the American Law Institute (especially as regards the Institute's
endeavor to produce a third torts restatement) is any indication, one can hardly expect
that body to fashion a silk purse from a sow's ear. In any event, restatements ought
to reflect judicial practice, and what courts are currently doing with conflicts cases
may be difficult to reproduce in black-letter form. Not only do the theoretical
foundations on which judges purport to rely vary from state to state,69 one cannot
even trustjudicial opinions to adhere faithfully to the doctrines they claim to follow.
To cite but one striking example: West Virginia ostensibly follows the old lex loci
delicti rule,70 and the state is counted among those that has escaped the "conflicts
revolution."'" In fact, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court has consistently
deviated from it whenever that rule invokes a substandard foreign rule of decision.
As Judge Workman explained:
It is the strong public policy of this State that persons injured by the negligence
of another should be able to recover in tort.
We therefore adhere to the rule that the doctrine of lex loci delicti will not be
invoked where the "application of the substantive law of a foreign state...
contravenes the public policy of this State."'

For this reason, the court applied the West Virginia comparative negligence rule
rather than the lex loci delicti's contributory negligence rule. Thus, the approach the

67. Symeonides, supra note 20, at 474.
68. For this reason Currie said, "We would be better off without rules." BRAINERD CURRIE,
Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 183 (1963).
69. Annual surveys published in the AmericanJournalofComparativeLaw contain charts
that attempt to categorize the courts' handiwork, dividing states by the doctrines their highest
courts profess to follow. For the latest one to be published, see Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in
American Courts,supra note 18, at 266.
70. See Mills v. Quality Supplier Trucking, Inc., 510 S.E.2d 280, 282 (W. Va. 1998). In
fact, the court said that this rule "'has long been the cornerstone of our [conflict of laws]
doctrine. The consistency, predictability, and ease of application provided by the traditional
doctrine are not to be discarded lightly."' Id.(citation omitted) (quoting Paul v. National Life,
352 S.E.2d 550, 555 (W. Va. 1986)).
71. Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts, supra note 18, at 266.
72. Mills, 510 S.E.2d at 282, 283 (last omission in original) (quoting Paul,352 S.E.2d at
556), in which the court had refused to apply the accident state's guest statute. See id. at 283.
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West Virginia Supreme Court purports to follow is not that which it actually applies;
in effect, that state ought to be counted among those that use the "better-law"
component of Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations."' 3
West Virginia is not the only state where theory and practice clash. Judicial
eclecticism, which treats disparate doctrines as interchangeable, 4 makes it a
hazardous venture to allocate any given state to particular conflicts theory. Even if
states could be pigeon-holed in this fashion, they do not consistently follow the
dogmas to which they profess allegiance, nor do lower courts and federal judges
necessarily adhere to what the state supreme court has ordained. In the words of one
commentator, "it is hard to read a lot of choice of law opinions without being terribly
disappointed in the quality of the analysis, which tends to be unsophisticated,
unthoughtful, and often unreasoned." 5 Apparently, judges use the modem
approaches to short-circuit choice-of-law problems and to apply whatever rules of
decision they wish to apply, usually those of the forum. If there is any consistency at
all, Currie's ethnocentric version of the governmental interest analysis approach,
according to which foreign law is rarely applied, may be said to predominate: 6 in the
large majority of cases the courts seek refuge in the lex fori. In consequence,
American conflicts law-which, since Story's times, had been informed by an urbane
comparativist approach, 77 - has become curiously omphaloscopic.
If American courts do in fact invariably apply the lex fori on one pretext or another,
it would be futile to insist on the subtle ratiocinations required by esoteric conflicts
theories. Why waste paper on a new restatement, ifthe gist of the judicial handiwork
can be stated in one simple sentence: "Thou shalt not apply foreign law"? Yet, while
such a rule may well reflect current conflicts practice-at least in tort cases-it would
hardly be desirable. Clearly, applying forum law without exception makes no sense
in other contexts. California courts would be ill-advised, for instance, to determine
the incidents of a marriage contracted in Pakistan by Pakistani nationals and
domiciliaries by reference to California law, should a dispute relating to that marriage
arise in California.78 Nor would the homing trend implicit in interest analysis and
other modem approaches serve the interests of trade and commerce. Should
American conflicts law preclude, for instance, an American corporation from
stipulating that its contract with a German company is governed by English law?79
.Obviously, common sense and justice require courts to apply, at least in some
instances, foreign law, even if scholars may be unable to tell them when that should

73. ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL.,

AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 95, at 277-79,

§ § 103-08, at

290-303, § 138, at 389-91 (4th ed. 1986).
74. See supratext accompanying notes 17-18.
75. Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and
Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 466 (1991).
76. See Robert A. Sedler, Essay, ProfessorJuenger's Challenge to the InterestAnalysis
Approach to Choice-of-Law: An Appreciation and a Response, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865,
866 (1990).
77. See JUENGER, supra note 6, at 29-30.
78. See In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499,502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (upholding
inheritance rights of wives of a bigamous marriage).
79. Cf The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (upholding a forumselection clause).
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be the case. We ought to pay more attention to that question instead of indulging in
nonrule approaches that leave judges frustrated and bewildered, as their complaints
demonstrate.80 Conflicts teachers may thrive on far-fetched theories and will-o'-thewisp approaches, but Rosenberg was surely right to remind us, during the "conflicts
revolution's" early stages, that multistate cases are not "rare and esoteric conundrums,
conceived for the titillation of philosophers ....Scholars, in their fascination with
conflicts, should not forget that the game is not being played so they can flex their
jurisprudential muscles, but in order to better the human condition through law."'"
Yet, given current conditions, one wonders whether a third restatement might not turn
out to be even worse than the second.
V. THE LURE OF THE LEX FORI
There are good reasons why the FirstRestatement lost favor with the courts and
why they embraced methodologies with a distinctive homing trend. It was not so
much Beale's silly vested rights doctrine82 that soured judges on his work product;
rather, judicial instinct rebelled against the unpalatable results his hard and fast tort
choice-of-law rules produced in practical application. The "conflicts revolution"
mirrored changes in substantive tort law. It flared up around the time when the rules
that govern accidents, especially traffic accidents, were undergoing serious reforms
(not the kind of thing that nowadays parades under that name). In those bygone days,
legislatures abrogated misconceived statutory provisions, such as caps on wrongful
death damages,83 courts began to overrule long-standing precedents that barred
recovery whenever the victim had been negligent," that allowed charities to maim
and kill with impunity"5 and that prohibited family members from suing each other, 6
and some went as far as to invoke constitutional provisions to strike down
substandard statutes, such as those that barred passengers from suing drivers.8 7
Once a legislature, or the highest tribunal of a state, has put its own house in order,
judges are wont to take a dim view ofunreformed foreign tort law a domestic choice-

80. See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal.
1975) (lamenting that the state of conflicts law was "a veritable jungle"); Fisher v. Huck, 624
P.2d 177, 178 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (comparing the "most significant relationships" approach
of the Second Restatement to "skeet shooting with a bow and arrow").
81. Maurice Rosenberg, Comment, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REV. 551,
644 (1968).
82. See JUENGER, supra note 6, at 90.
83. See 2 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY §

7:1 (3d ed. 1992).
84. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co.. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975): Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.
2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
85. See, e.g., President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
cf Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 1969) (stating intention to abolish the
charitable immunity doctrine the next time it came before the court).
86. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1962); Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771
(Wash. 1972).
87. See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1973); Whitworth v. Bynum, 699
S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1985).
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of-law rule may invoke. Courts can hardly be blamed for not allowing defendants to
drag in from abroad contributory negligence, charitable and intrafamily immunities,
limitations on wrongful recovery, guest statutes, and other relics that the forum had
88
just abolished. After all,judges tend to favor fair results. Because plaintiffs can shop
for a favorable forum, such results can, in many interstate and international tort cases,
be achieved by simply applying the reformed lex fori. If one reads the series of
"revolutionary" tort choice-of-law decisions from Kilbergv.NortheastAirlines,Inc.89
to Tooker v. Lopez," one notices a stereotyped pattern underlying the case law of the
New York Court of Appeals: the defendant (or rather counsel furnished by the
defendant's insurer) invokes the lex loci delicti, which contained some odious foreign
tort rule, such as a guest statute, that is at odds with forum law.
It should be obvious why judges liked the new approaches scholars advocated
during the "conflicts revolution": the Second Restatement's nonrules and Currie's
"governmental interest" analysis allowed them to ward off substandard foreign rules
of decision.9 Thus, the revolutionary doctrines' homing trend had, in general, 92a
benign effect (even though the modern doctrines could be easily "misinterpreted").
The fact that these doctrines improved the level of interstate justice does not,
however, necessarily support the conclusion that they are sound and desirable.
Indeed, it seems to me that the "revolution" has had a pernicious effect on American
conflicts law. Serving as a handy pretext, the nouvelle vague prevented courts from
articulating the true reason for deciding as they did; the true reason being, in my
opinion, that the judges wanted to dispense an interstate justice that was not
qualitatively inferior to that meted out in purely domestic cases.
93
Nowadays, in an era of a new kind of "tort law reform," the modern teachings'
forum bias has the opposite effect. That "reform," promoted by powerful lobbies, has
succeeded in persuading state legislatures to curtail, in various and sundry ways, the
rights of accident victims.94 Since not two of these statutes are alike, the "reformers"
have managed to balkanize American tort law. In consequence, nowadays in many
instances inferior domestic law, which is the product of astute lobbying rather than
the judicious reevaluation of existing rules, conflicts with superior foreign law.

88. "Justice inthe individual case has always been one of the objectives of law, and judges
properly take pride in the effort to achieve it." LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 73, § 88, at 262.
89. 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961).
90. 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969).
91. See

JUENGER,

supra note 6, at 146-48.

92. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 43 1.
93. Concerning the relevance of "tort law reform" to conflicts law, see Louise Weinberg,
Mass Torts at the Neutral Forum: A Critical Analysis of the American Law Institute's
Proposed Choice Rule, 56 ALB. L. REv. 807, 824-26 (1993).
94. For a quick glance at the motley array of statutory provisions, which range from
inroads on the collateral-source rule to the abolition of the collateral-source rule, see the stateby-state listing in Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis
andthe Law Reform Process, 27 HOus. L. REv. 207,220-22 (1990); see also Mark Thompson,
Letting the Air out of Tort Reform, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 64, 65. The baikanizing effect of
"tort reform" has been enhanced by the fact that by "the end of 1996, high courts in 24 states
had handed down 61 different decisions overturning all or parts of laws that attempted to limit
damages or erect other hurdles to discourage tort suits." Id.
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Accordingly, instead of raising the level of interstate justice, in present circumstances
the forum bias of modern conflicts approaches is bound to lower it. Hence, while the
first wave of the "conflicts revolution" improved the lot of interstate and international
accident victims, given current realities, one may expect it to have the opposite effect
in future tort cases.
The potential for bad results is not the only thing new and old conflicts approaches
share. Often overlooked is their common philosophy. Interest analysts, as well as
those who prefer hard and fast rules of the traditional kind, may fail to notice that
Beale and Currie were birds of a feather.95 Both subscribed to legal positivism and
made the notion of sovereignty96 central to their teachings. They shared the belief that
interstate and international transactions must, of necessity, be submitted to the law of
a particular state or nation. In reality, however, interstate and international
transactions are, by their very nature, sufficiently different from purely domestic ones
to pose the legitimate question whether they ought not to be governed by some form
of international or supranational law.97 At the very least, as scholars have pointed
out9" and judges have acknowledged,99 rules adopted for domestic consumption can
present an obstacle to international commerce because they may be ill-suited to deal
with transnational realities.
To be sure, of these scholars Currie was the more chauvinistic. The First
Restatement's Reporter at least acknowledged that overarching considerations of
federalism and internationalism are important in interstate and international cases, in
short, that comity counts."° In marked contrast, Currie believed that judges, being
mere mouthpieces of the legislature, lack the freedom (which they enjoy in other
civilized legal systems)' of sacrificing domestic policies when the forum is
"interested" in some fashion. 0 2 To hypothesize, as Currie did, a "Hobbesian state of
nature"'0 3 that supposedly prevails among the component states of this country defies

95. See JUENGER, supra note 6, at 159-60.
96. This, of course, is the reason why, as Richman and Reynolds, supra note 10, at 427,
point out, both rejected or ignored the important concept of party autonomy.
97. See JUENGER, supra note 6, at 160-61.
98. See QUINTiN ALFONSIN, TEORiA DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 46-47
(1955); D. JOSEPHUS JiTTA, LA METHODE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvt 44 (Paris, Marchal
et Billard 1890).
99. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
100. See 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTOF LAWS § 1.3, at 4-5 (1935).
Beale was, however, of a sufficiently positivistic mind-set to take issue with the notion of
comity. See id. § 6.1, at 53-55.
10 1. In Europe, for instance, there has been a wave of conflicts codification ranging from
Portugal to Russia, and even the United Kingdom has seen fit to enact a choice-of-law statute.
See Friedrich K. Juenger, Two EuropeanConflicts Conventions,28 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON
L. REV. 527, 536 (1998). For a partial list of codifications see SYMEONIDES, PERDUE & VON
MEHREN, supra note 32, at ix-x. The large majority of statutory choice-of-law rules are of the

traditional multilateral variety, which invoke foreign law with considerable frequency. That
is also true in France, even though most of the French choice-of-law rules are judge-made. See
BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 20 (1991).
102. See CURRIE, supra note 68, at 183-84.
103. Arthur T. von Mehren, Book Review, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 91, 94 (1964) (reviewing
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reality, as does his exaggerated emphasis on sovereign prerogatives.' Even as
regards international transactions, Currie's notion of splendid isolation looks
curiously dated now that "globalization" has become the clich6 of choice. It is also
out of sync with the conflicts philosophy that prevails elsewhere. As a German
conflicts scholar, for instance, put it more than twenty years ago, "the idea of
sovereignty,which in our century has become dubious even in international law, does
not, at least in private international law, perform any useful service."' '
VI. WHAT

To Do

Given the doctrinal confusion that currently prevails, it may prove difficult to rerestate the law of conflicts. Instead of attempting to cast in black letters the
unrestateable mixture of academic teachings and judicial fumbling that characterizes
American conflicts law, we might do better to reassess the foundations of our
discipline. It has long been my contention that such a reassessment will inevitably
have to answer the question whether it is true-as both Beale and Currie
thought-that results do not matter in interstate and international cases."° The
proposition thatjudges should be oblivious to the outcomes ofthe cases they decide 07
is unique to the conflict of laws; no other legal discipline harbors such a strange idea.
As Roscoe Pound put it:
[Law] must be judged by the result it achieves, not by the niceties of its internal
structure; it must be valued to the extent to which it meets its end, not by the
beauty of its logical processes or the strictness with which its rules proceed from
the dogmas it takes for its foundation." 8
I submit that it is high time to make this objective the focal point of inquiry. As I have
shown elsewhere,"° there are but three basic choice-of-law methods: multilateralism,
unilateralism, and the substantive law approach. Whereas the first two methods
elevate geography over teleology,"' the substantive law approach is designed to
achieve fair results in multistate cases. The first two approaches have had a long run;
multilateralism was the hallmark of the First Restatement, unilateralism that of
Currie's interest analysis, and both informed the eclectic SecondRestatement.For far
too long, the substantive law approach"' has been neglected by most scholars and

BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963)).

104. See JUENGER, supra note 6, at 135-36, 159-61.
105.
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PRiVATRECHTS 71 (2d ed. 1976) (emphasis in original).
106. See JUENGER, supranote 6, at 233-37. But see Weinberg, supra note 19, at 492-97.
107. But see LEFLARETAL., supranote 73, § 88, at 261-63; David F. Cavers, A Critiqueof
the Choice-of-Law Process,47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 189 (1933).
108. Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 605 (1908).
109. See JUENGER, supra note 6, at 45-46.
110. As Weinberg asks rhetorically, "[W]hat difference can the location of the
discrimination make?" Weinberg, supranote 19, at 481.
I11. See GENE R. SHREVE, A CONFLICT-OF-LAWS ANTHOLOGY 139-52 (1997).
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restaters,"12 even though courts have practiced it," 3 not only after they embarked on

the "conflicts revolution" ' 4 but even when rules were still seemingly hard and fast. " '
In fact, as a recent West Virginia Supreme Court decision shows," 6 courts in states
that have retained the seemingly insensitive rules mandated by the FirstRestatement
may be able to mete out a better measure of interstate justice than the "progressive"
New York Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the advocates of a third restatement ought to make some concession to
what courts actually do. But even those who question the value of such a project need
to consider the substantive law approach." 7 That approach has the definite merit of
promoting not only multistatejustice but also domestic law reform.' If we can agree
that this approach deserves serious consideration, we may find it easy enough to draft
some fairly simple, straightforward alternative reference rules that would enshrine
it." 9 Should it be inadvisable to put rules of that nature into a new conflicts
restatement, because courts and scholars keep paying obeisance to the unilateralist
and multilateralist schools of thought, they could of course be incorporated into a
2
120
model (or a uniform) act.1 '

112. See id. at 34-40.
113. Thus, as regards contract choice of law for instance, they have promoted substantive
policies by recognizing the fundamental principle of party autonomy, a principle that is at odds
with both the multilateral and the unilateral approaches. See JUENGER, supranote 6, at 218-20.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
115. See JUENGER, supra note 6, at 96, 173-77.
116. See supratext accompanying notes 70-73.
117. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 435.
118. Cf Weinberg, supra note 19, at 507 (discussing the forum adopting better foreign law).
119. See JUENGER, supra note 6, at 196-97 (drafting example of products liability choice of
law); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex LitigationProject's Tort Choice-of-Law Rules, 54
LA. L. REV. 907, 923 (1994) (choice-of-law rules for mass torts).
120. But see Kramer, supra note 1, at 2146-49.
121. Richman and Reynolds point out that in the United States "statutory directives on
choice of law are quite rare." Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 421 n.23. In many
countries, including the United Kingdom, however, the conflict of laws has been codified in
whole or in part. See supra note 101.

